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In a monopolistic competition macromodel with endogenous market structure, the fiscal
multiplier is shown to consist of two components. One component depicts the response of
output to a fiscal expansion through the conventional channels that disregard the role of
market imperfections and a second one captures the effect of both firms’ market power and
the policy induced change in the market structure. The latter effect – which is missing
from the existing studies – is shown to be quite crucial in raising the fiscal multiplier even
above unity, and also in improving consumers’ welfare when the labour market is
competitive.
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1I.  Introduction
It is now well established that an aggregate demand stimulating fiscal expansion is more
likely to raise output when firms possess a certain degree of monopoly or market power
which enables them to set their price level above their marginal cost. But while it is
generally agreed that the size of fiscal multiplier depends, to a great extent, on firms’
monopoly or market power, little attention is devoted to exploring the interaction between
fiscal policy and the firms’ ability to mark up their price. This is because the studies in this
area have either assumed a fixed market structure, e.g. an oligopolistic goods market with
a given number of firms and ad hoc barriers to entry, or disregarded a channel through
which a change in total output could affect the markup – see, for example, Dixon (1987),
Mankiw (1988) and Molana and Moutos (1992) for the former and Startz (1989) and
Dixon and Lawler (1996) for the latter1. To appreciate this important channel, we note that
if a fiscal intervention is effective in raising the level of output permanently, its impact on
the market structure should also be permanent. In these existing models which consider
symmetric equilibrium with identical firms, the latter impact usually takes one of two
forms: i) the number of firms remains intact but the size of each firm’s market grows, as in
Dixon, Mankiw or the short-run cases in Startz and Dixon and Lawler; ii) the number of
firms and the level of output adjust proportionally, so there are more firms but each firm’s
market share is unaffected, as in the long-run cases in Startz and Dixon and Lawler. In all
cases, however, firms’ monopoly or market power is assumed to be unaffected by these
changes.
In this paper we propose a more general framework which allows for a firm’s market
power to both affect and be affected by fiscal policy. To explain the relevance of allowing
                                                          
1
  See the discussions in Heijdra et al (1998), Silvestre (1993) and Dixon and Rankin (1995) on the fiscal
multiplier in models with monopolistic competition.
2for such a two-way causation, it is helpful to decompose the long-run fiscal multiplier into
two distinct components. One component depicts the response of output to a fiscal
expansion through the conventional channels that disregard the role of market
imperfections. This is then adjusted by a second component that captures the effect of both
firms’ market power and the policy-induced change in the market structure. To be more
precise, let us measure firms’ market power by their ability to mark up their prices over
their marginal costs. Denoting output, government expenditure and markup by Y, G and µ,
respectively, the above explanation suggests a decomposition of the multiplier as
( ))dG/d,(m1MdG/dY µµ+= ,  where M  is a fixed parameter and m is a function
which captures the role of imperfect competition and depends on both the level of markup
as well as the way markup is affected by a change in G. Provided that m(1, 0)=0 holds, M
represents the conventional component of the multiplier which would be obtained in the
extreme case of perfect competition, that is as 1→µ  and 0G/ →∂∂µ . We stress that
here m is assumed to depend on both the level of markup and its policy induced change.
But the latter factor has been completely ignored in the existing studies which assume that
µ remains unaffected when the government expenditure is raised and therefore set
dµ/dG=0.
In this paper we argue that the assumption of a constant markup does not conform
with the perception that has led to the introduction of goods market imperfections to
macroeconomic models, especially when government purchases are filtered through the
goods market; µ is a measure of market imperfection which is expected to decline as the
market size is expanded and competition intensified. We also show that this assumption is
likely to result in a serious omission that has considerable consequences for the size of the
fiscal multiplier. To do so, in Section II we develop a model of imperfect competition with
3endogenous goods market structure, which we then use in Section III to derive an
expression for the multiplier in a way that the two distinct effects of a fiscal expansion on
output are explicitly dichotomised as described above. It is shown that, if private and
public expenditures are not perfect substitutes, the fiscal multiplier is positive and the
contribution of the effect due to changes in market structure can in fact be quite
significant, raising the multiplier above unity. In Section IV we analyse the welfare effect
of a fiscal expansion and show that the existence of the additional market structure effect
can in fact play a crucial role in improving consumers’ welfare when the labour market is
competitive. Section V concludes the paper.
II.  The Model
The model is similar in spirit to standard macromodels that introduce goods market
imperfections. It replaces total output with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
quantity index for a horizontally differentiated product and assumes that each firm enjoys a
monopoly power in the production of a single brand (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987,
for an example and Matsuyama, 1995, for further details). As in most other studies in this
area, the model portrays a simple market economy comprising three types of agents;
households, firms and a government. The distinguishing feature of the model is in
endogenising the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of the differentiated
product. Thus, unlike the existing models of monopolistic competition in which the
elasticity of substitution between (the horizontally differentiated) product varieties – and
hence firms’ markup – is constant, we endogenise the markup by allowing the elasticity of
substitution to rise as the range of goods is extended. Finally, although the model is based
on an intertemporal structure, the analysis will be focused on the long-run equilibrium and
the short-run implications of the model will not be explored in this paper.
4Households
The representative household’s problem is to choose paths of its consumption and labour
supply to maximise the lifetime utility,
( )dt)t(L),t(CueU
0
et∫∞ −= ρ ,     (1)
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference, t is the time index, Ce denotes the
effective consumption and L is labour supply. The instantaneous utility function is given by
( ) ( )( )
s1
L1C)L,C(u
s11e
e
−
−⋅
=
−
−αα
;    s < 1;   0<α<1,            (2)
where the time index t is suppressed hereafter and labour supply endowment is normalised
to unity. Following Aschauer (1985), the effective consumption is defined as a composite
good consisting of private and public consumption, denoted by C and G  respectively, as
follows
GCC e θ+= ;  θ ≤1,            (3)
where θ  is a constant parameter. While a positive θ may be interpreted as a measure of
substitutability between private and public consumption, i.e. each unit of G is equivalent to
θ units of C, the possibility of a negative θ should not be excluded2.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
CTVwLK)r(K −−++−= δ ,            (4)
where w is the wage rate, V is the profit share accrued to the household (firms are assumed
to be owned by the household), T is a lump-sum tax paid to the government and K is
                                                          
2
  As pointed out by an anonymous referee, there is an inconsistency in this definition of effective
consumption; θ <0 implies that G is ‘consumption bad’ rather than a complement since it yields negative
marginal utility and hence the consumer needs to raise C to compensate for this negative externality.
Karras (1994) provides international evidence on θ  which shows that for some countries it may in fact be
negative. See also Kuehlwein (1998) and Graham (1995) for further evidence from the USA on specific
spending categories. Molana and Moutos (1989) and Zhang (1998) discuss other theoretical implications.
5physical capital which is the only asset in the economy. Capital changes at rate K and
earns interest r but depreciates at a constant rate δ.
The household’s optimisation problem is to choose C, L, and K to maximise (1)
subject to (2)-(4). The current-value Hamiltonian is
( ) ( )( ) ( )CTVwLK)r(
s1
L1GCH
s11
−−++−+
−
−⋅+
=
−
−
δζθ
αα
,
where ζ is the costate variable. The first order conditions, corresponding to C, L, and K,
respectively, are
( ) ( ) ζθα αα =−+ −−−− )s1)(1(1)s1( L1GC ,            (5)
( ) ( ) wL1GC)1( 1)s1)(1()s1( ζθα αα =−+− −−−− ,                   (6)
)r( −+= δρζζ .            (7)
Equations (5) and (6) imply
w
L1
GC1
=


−
+

 − θ
α
α
,            (8)
and 0K =  and 0=ζ  hold in a steady-state equilibrium. Using the latter, (7) implies the
well-known result that in equilibrium the rate of interest on savings should be sufficient to
cover the cost of postponing consumption and maintaining the capital stock, namely
δρ +=r .            (9)
Firms and the Goods Market
The description of the goods market outlined below closely follows from Galí (1995). The
production aspect of the model is therefore divided into two stages relating to a continuum
of intermediate goods which are used to process a final good.
6The final good
There is a final good that can be used for private and public consumption, C and G, or for
capital accumulation K. This good is assumed to be produced and sold under perfect
competition and for simplicity we approximate the mass of competitive producers by a
single representative firm. The production technology uses a continuum of inputs and
obeys the CES production function
( ) ( )
)n(
n
0
)n(/1
j
)n(/11 djynY
µ
µµ 



= ∫−− ,          (10)
where Y is the quantity of the final good, yj denotes the quantity of the intermediate goods
– or inputs –  indexed j∈[0, n], and ++ → RR:µ  is assumed to be a continuously
differentiable function such that3
1)n(lim;1)n(lim;0)n(
dn
)n(d
n0n =>=<′= ∞→→ µµµµ
µ
.          (11)
In the rest of the paper we shall suppress n and simply use µ in place of µ(n).
At any point in time the firm uses the available range [0, n] of inputs and the
technology described in (10) to maximise its profits
∫−= n
0
jjY djypYΠ ,          (12)
where pj is price of input indexed j, and given that the firm is price taker, the price level for
the final good is set to unity by normalisation. Letting )1/()n( −= µµε  and defining
                                                          
3
  As it will become clear below, the negative relationship between µ and n is somewhat exogenous and
arises from the correspondence between the µ and ε – the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods – where ε is assumed to rise as the range of inputs, n, expands. Nevertheless, the results derived
later do not hinge on the particular mechanism that generates such a relationship. As recognised by Galí
(1995), any other choice of technologies, preferences, and market structure that preserved the required
property would also give rise to a similar outcome.
7∫≡ n
0
jj djypE  and  ( )
( ))n(1/1
n
0
)n(1
j djp)n/1(P
ε
ε
−
− 



≡ ∫ ,
it is straightforward to show that the above maximisation implies the following input
demand functions for all j∈[0, n],






=
−
n
P/E
P
p
y
)n(
j
j
ε
.          (13)
Two points are worth noting. First, substituting for yj from (13) into (10) implies
Y=E/P. Thus (12) can be written as ( )E1)P/1(Y −=Π . Given that by construction the
final good is produced under price taking – perfect competition – condition, P is taken as
given and the constant returns to scale property insures that the zero profit condition is
satisfied and 0Y =Π , which implies P=1 and Y=E. As a result, (13) is equivalent to



=
−
n
Ypy )n(jj
ε
.         (13')
Second, as it is clear from (13), ε(n) is the elasticity of substitution among inputs
whose properties follow from (11), namely
∞→>=>′=
∞→→ )n(lim;1)n(lim;0)n(dn
)n(d
n0n εεεε
ε
.          (14)
In other words, as the range of the inputs expands the distinction between them reduces
and they approach to perfect substitutes.
Intermediate goods
The market for intermediate goods is characterised by a standard monopolistic competition
structure comprising a continuum of firms each producing a differentiated good which is
indexed j∈[0, n] and is used as an input by the final good producer as described above.
Each firm uses an increasing returns to scale technology
( ) ( ) φββ −= −1jjj kAy  ,   (15)
8where y is the quantity of output, k and   are variable inputs denoting the quantity of
capital and labour respectively, A>0 and 0≤ β<1 are constant parameters and φ is the
quantity of fixed input  (assumed to be identical for intermediate good producers) which is
required before positive output is obtained. Thus, firm  j’s profit is
jjjjj rkwyp −−= π .          (16)
At any point in time, each firm chooses   and k to maximise its profit subject to
demand in (13') and production function in (15). The first order conditions are
0/ jj =∂∂ π  and 0k/ jj =∂∂π  which, taking account of the relevant restrictions, can be
written as
w
)y(p1
j
jj
=


 +



 −

φ
µ
β
,
r
k
)y(p
j
jj
=


 +



 φ
µ
β
.
These conditions show clearly that µ>1 acts as the markup factor. That is, unlike a price
taker firm which operates at the level where the marginal product and the marginal cost of
each factor of production are equal, the monopolistically competitive firm uses µ to mark
up the value of marginal product of each factor of production above its marginal cost.
Under symmetry (identical firms), in equilibrium we have, for all j∈[0, n], 1Pp j == ,
n/Yy j = , n/Lj = , n/Kk j = , and n/j Ππ =  where ∫= n
0
jdjL  , ∫= n
0
jdjkK , and
∫= n
0
jdjπΠ . Making use of these, the above first order conditions are rewritten in terms of
the aggregate variables as follows
w
L
nY1
=

 +


 − φ
µ
β
,   (17)
9r
K
nY
=

 +


 φ
µ
β
,   (18)
which can be used to determine the aggregate non-profit – or factor – income,
µ
φnY
rKwL +=+ .   (19)
Finally, aggregating (16) gives the profit income rKwLY −−=Π , which using (19)
implies
µ
φµΠ nY)1( −−= .          (20)
III.  General Equilibrium and the Effects of a Fiscal Expansion
The long-run equilibrium condition for the intermediate good industry, implied by the free
entry assumption, is given by the zero profit condition. In other words, n adjusts to ensure
that Π=0. Therefore, imposing this on (20) yields
1n
Y
−
=
µ
φ
,          (21)
which shows how each firm’s optimal long-run scale of production depends on its markup.
Equations (21) and (19) show the equivalence between total factor income and output,
wL+rK=Y.
In the steady state equilibrium 0K =  and V=Π+ΠY = 0 and the government budget
constraint is balanced, hence T = G. Substituting these and (19') into equation (4) gives
GKCY ++= δ ,          (22)
which describes the final good market equilibrium condition, or simply the national
accounts identity: the right-hand-side comprises the components of the long-run aggregate
demand – private consumption, replacement investment and the government expenditure –
while the left-hand-side is the quantity of final output.
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Two other equilibrium conditions are obtained from (8) and (17), and (9) and (18),
respectively, namely



−=


−
+

 −
L
Y)1(
L1
GC1 βθ
α
α
,          (23)
δρβ +=


K
Y
.                 (24)
Finally, aggregating (15) and making use of (21) to eliminate the parameter φ, we
obtain the aggregate production function in the long-run,
ββµ −= 1LK)/A(Y .   (25)
Given the relation between µ and n as described in (11), we now have a system of five
equations, (21)-(25), in five endogenous variables, Y, L, K, C, and n. But since a specific
functional form for µ(n) is not imposed, we first solve (22)-(25) for Y, L, K, and C in terms
of µ and G, and then introduce (21) and take account of the impact of n on µ. The solutions
for C, L and K are4
G1
1
)1(
1
C )1/(1 


−
+
−
+


+
=
−−
λ
λθµλ
λγ β
,          (26)
)1/(1
)1(
G)1(
1
1L βµ
γλ
θ
λ
−



+
−
+
+
= ,          (27)
G
1
)1(
1
K )1/(1 


+
−
+


+
=
−−
λ
ηθµλ
γη β
,          (28)
where
)1/(1
A
)1(
))(1( ββ
δρ
β
α
δρβαγ
−




+
⋅
−
+−
= ,          (29)
( )
))(1(
)1()1(
δρβα
δβραλ
+−
−+−
= ,          (30)
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)()1(
)1(
δρβα
βαη
+−
−
= .          (31)
Equations (26)-(28) are ‘quasi-reduced form’ equations which can be used to show
the role of endogenising the markup, µ. When µ is treated as a constant parameter, the
effect of a change in G on C, L, and K is unambiguous and is identical to the existing
results in the literature; a rise in public spending reduces private consumption5 and
intensifies the utilisation of both factors of production. But as we shall see below, within
our framework a fiscal expansion reduces µ. This is because by raising the aggregate
demand for the final good a rise in G gives rise to a profit-making opportunity in the
intermediate goods sector and stimulates new entry which expands the mass of firms but
reduces their market power. As a result, the effect of a fiscal expansion on private
consumption and factors of production is altered once the market structure effect of a rise
in G is taken into account. As it can be easily verified from equations (26)-(28), allowing µ
to be negatively affected by G reduces the impact of a fiscal expansion on C and L, and
intensifies the utilisation of K. The policy effectiveness results are therefore likely to differ
significantly once the assumption of a fixed markup is relaxed.
Effects of Policy on Market Structure
Before solving for output and deriving the expression for the fiscal multiplier, it is helpful
to pay some attention to the free-entry/zero-profit condition in (21), and use it to clarify an
important point of concern. Suppose that firms’ monopoly power in the intermediate
sector, µ, is exogenously fixed and hence is independent of the size of the input range, or
                                                                                                                                                                              
4
  Algebraic details underlying all the derivations throughout the paper are available from the authors on
request.
5
  This will definitely follow if 0≤θ<1, which may be imposed for comparability.
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the corresponding mass of firms, n. In this case, 0)n( =′µ , and if a policy is effective in
raising aggregate output it must do so by invoking new entry without affecting the firms’
size. This is because, as implied by (21), when µ is constant Y and n change
proportionately so as to keep Y/n constant. Now suppose that firms’ monopoly power is
inversely related to n. This is likely to be the case since as the range of goods is expanded
the elasticity of substitution between them also increases simply because they become
closer substitutes. As a result, firms are likely to face a reduction in their market
(monopoly) power, hence 0)n( <′µ  as in (11). In such circumstances, if a fiscal expansion
is effective and raises both Y and n, it follows from (21) that Y/n should also rise.
Therefore, the new (symmetric) equilibrium will be characterised by a bigger mass of
weaker or more competitive firms each supplying a larger quantity of output. This rise in
supply follows from the fact that as firms’ lose their market power they are forced to set
lower prices which in turn implies a rise in quantity. An interesting implication of this
result is that a successful fiscal intervention will also raise the degree of competition in the
goods market. Or, put differently, provided that government consumption is filtered
through the goods market, a relatively larger public sector will induce, rather than
discourage, a higher level of competition between firms. Furthermore, given that such a
policy also reduces firms’ ability to mark up, it is also likely to have desirable welfare
implications through raising consumer surplus6.
Let us therefore investigate how in this model a fiscal expansion affects the market
structure captured by the size of the interval [0,n] containing the mass of firms and their
market power µ. It can be shown that in the steady-state equilibrium, n, µ and G are related
to each other by the following relationship
                                                          
6
  There will be no implications for producer surplus since entry completely erodes profits.
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G
1
n
2)1/(1
1 σ
µ
σ
µ
φ
β +=
−
−
,          (32)
where 0)1/()(1 >++= λδηλγσ , and 0)1/())(1(2 >++−= λδηλθσ . The left-hand-
side of (32) can be interpreted as the supply of Y which satisfies the zero profit condition
in (21), and the right-hand-side expression is simply the demand for Y obtained by
substituting in (22) for C and K from (26) and (28), respectively.
Totally differentiating (32) yields
1
)1/(11
1
22 )1()1(
n
1dG
dn
−
−+ 







−
−
−
′−
−
= βµβ
σ
µ
φµ
µ
φ
σ ,
whose sign is determined by
)1/(11
1
2 )1()1(
n
βµβ
σ
µ
φ
−+
−
−
−
,
which, using (32), can be expressed as folows
1
G
)1)(1(
)1(
)1()1(
n 2
)1/(11
1
)1/(11
1
2
−
+
−−
−
=
−
−
−
−+−+ µ
σ
µµβ
σµβ
µβ
σ
µ
φ
ββ ,
which is definitely positive if µ≤1/β. Thus, given that 0dn/d <=′ µµ , it follows that
dn/dG≥0 holds as long as µ≤1/β and θ≤1where the latter ensures σ2≥0.  As a result,
0)dG/dn(dG/d ≤′= µµ  also definitely holds if β<1/µ and θ≤1.  Finally, note that
dµ/dG=dn/dG=0 when θ = 1.
It is useful to illustrate the relationship between n and G – and hence µ and G – by
means of a simple graph depicting the two sides of equation (32). In Figure 1 below we
have drawn the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side of equation (32) and labelled them
as YD and YS, respectively. Both YS and YD are upward sloping since their first derivatives
with respect to n are positive. Given that GYY 2
)1/(1
1
D
L
D σµσ β +=→ −−  and 0Y S →  as
14
0n → , and that GYY 21
D
U
D σσ +=→  and ∞→SY  as ∞→n , a unique equilibrium
exists if YS is everywhere steeper than YD. The sufficient condition for this can be shown to
be µ≤1/β which is the condition required for dn/dG>0, and is in fact satisfied by
empirically plausible values of µ and β used by other studies7. Because a rise in G shifts
YD up but leaves YS unaffected, n, and hence µ(n), ought to change so as to restore the
equality between YD and YS. This requires n to rise, and hence µ(n) to fall, until YD = YS is
achieved which establishes that, dn/dG>0 and dµ/dG<0.
Figure 1.   Effect on the Market Structure, n and µ,
                  of a Rise in Government Expenditure, G.
        Y
                                                                                                                                                                 YS
                                                                                                                                                          ∆G
        
D
UY
                                                                                                          YD
                                                                                                                                                              ∆G
        
D
LY
            0                                                                                                                                                              n
        )( µµ →                                                                                                                                       )1( →µ
                                                          
7
  The empirical value of the capital elasticity of output, β, lies in the range from 0.25 (e.g. Lucas, 1988) to
0.42 (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1994), while the markup, µ, lies in the range from 1.05 to 2.3 (e.g.
Morrison, 1990, Norbin, 1993, and Roeger, 1995).
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The result that a fiscal expansion leads to a larger participation in the intermediate
goods sector is highly intuitive. A rise in government spending generates an opportunity of
profit-making for the incumbent firms in the intermediate sector. This stimulates new entry
and induces the incumbents to raise their output, as a result of which demand for factors of
production, i.e. labour and capital, rises. When the markup factor is determined
endogenously, entry intensifies competition and weakens firms’ market power. This
reduction in firms’ ability to mark up their costs enhances their supply and induces further
increases in factor demands, hence giving rise to a ‘Keynesian type’ second round
multiplier effect through generating additional factor income. It is therefore conceivable
that the policy impacts in this model are stronger than those obtained in models which treat
the markup factor as a fixed parameter and hence eliminate the possibility of such second
round effects.
Effects of Policy on Output
The solution for Y can be obtained by substituting for C and K from (26) and (28) into
(22),
( )G)1(
1
Y )1/(1 θγµλ
δηλ β
−+


+
+
=
−−
,          (33)
which shows clearly why endogenising µ can make a significant difference in policy
effectiveness since a rise in G will have a direct impact on Y as well as an indirect effect
through reducing µ. The output multiplier can be written as
0
dG
d
m1M
dG
dY
>


⋅−=
µ
,                (34)
where
)1/(11)1)(1(m βµθβ
γ
−+
−−
= >0,          (35)
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λ
θδηλ
+
−+
=
1
)1)((M >0.          (36)
Equation (34) substantiates the claim made in the introduction that the output
multiplier can be explicitly decomposed into two components consisting of a
‘conventional’ part M , and an adjustment factor given by the term in square brackets. As
can be seen from (36), M  does not involve any element related to the market structure and
would in fact be the total multiplier if the policy did not induce any changes in firms’
market power, i.e. if  dµ/dG = 0. In other words, either a perfectly competitive goods
market or an exogenously fixed markup will cause the second term to disappear, implying
MdG/dY = . However, the adjustment factor modifies the multiplier for the market
structure effects when a rise in G induces a change in firms’ market power. It is important
to stress here that the adjustment part itself also consists of two explicit factors. First, there
is dµ/dG which is clearly the dominating, or the crucial, factor since the adjustment effect
vanishes as dµ/dG  . The effect of this is however scaled by the second factor, m ,
which depends negatively on the extent of firms’ market power, µ.
It is worth highlighting the difference between the multiplier in (34) and its
counterpart derived under the assumption of an exogenously fixed markup. For instance,
the multiplier derived in Mankiw (1988) can be written as the following convergent sum,
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01)1(
dG
dY 3**2***** >++++−= µαµαµαα ,          (37)
where α* and µ* are similar to α and µ above. More precisely, α* is the taste parameter in
the utility function )L1ln()1()Cln(u ** −−+= αα  which corresponds to (2) with θ = 0
and s = 1, and µ* is a measure similar to µ but is scaled such that )1,0(* ∈µ  whereas
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),1( µµ∈ 8. Thus, in perfect competition (37) approaches its minimum value  (1-α*)
which is identical to M  in (36) evaluated at α = α*, θ = 0 and β=0 where the latter is
imposed for comparability since there is no capital in Mankiw’s model9. But while the
multipliers in (34) and (37) are very similar at the lower limit – i.e. when 0* →µ  and
0dG/d;1 =→ µµ  – there are two main discrepancies between them. First, unlike
Mankiw’s multiplier which is a positive and monotonic function of the markup µ*, (34)
does not necessarily imply a positive relationship between the multiplier and µ. This result,
which undermines the claim that the inefficiency due to the existence of market power
strengthens the effectiveness of fiscal policy, has already been discussed in the literature
(see Dixon and Lawler, 1996, and Torregrosa, 1998). Second, unlike (37) which has an
upper limit of unity that is obtained as 1* →µ , the multiplier in (34) can exceed unity if
the magnitude of )dG/dn)(/(/]dG/d[ µµµµ ′=  is sufficiently large. One important
consequence of the latter point is that the balanced budget fiscal multiplier is
unambiguously larger, the more responsive is the entry and competition process to an
exogenous change in aggregate demand.
To further appreciate the underlying intuition for the above result, we compare it to
the long-run multiplier obtained by Startz (1989). He uses a similar model of monopolistic
competition and defines the markup factor µ identical to that used in this paper. But he
treats µ as a constant parameter, excludes capital – hence β=0 – and postulates a Stone-
Geary utility function )LL1ln()1()GGln()CCln(u ogcogoc −−−−+−+−= αααα ,
where αg fulfils a similar role as θ. He illustrates that in the long-run when entry is allowed
                                                          
8
  Mankiw (1988) defines µ* as (1 – marginal cost/price). Hence the relationship between µ and µ* may be
approximated by )]1/()1][(/[* −−= µµµµµ  where µ  is the upper limit of µ, as described in
(11). We are grateful to the referee who attracted our attention to this point.
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to erode all profits there is always a crowding out which reduces the multiplier below
unity, to )1/()1(dG/dY ggc ααα −−−= . To obtain the equivalent to this multiplier from
our model, we let β=0 and dµ/dG=0 in (34). These imply )1)(1(MdG/dY θα −−==
which is definitely less than unity but positive. However, unlike Startz’s model, the present
model allows for generating the so-called ‘Keynesian type second round effects’ even in
the absence of a profit multiplier (on which Dixon, Mankiw and Startz rely), as described
at the end of previous sub-section, which could in fact fully compensate for the crowding
out and raise the long-run multiplier above unity.
IV.  Welfare Effects of a Fiscal Expansion
Although the impact of a fiscal expansion on output may be positive and relatively large, it
remains unclear whether or not this effect  improves consumers’ welfare. This is because a
larger output may not necessarily imply a larger private consumption, but it is more likely
to entail a higher labour supply, and the latter will reduce utility when leisure appears as an
argument in the utility function and the labour market is competitive.
To derive the welfare effect of the policy, in this section we briefly examine how the
level of the representative household’s lifetime utility is affected by a change in
government expenditure. The long-run welfare effect of the policy therefore is measured
by du/dG. Thus, differentiating equations (2), (26) and (27) with respect to G and solving
them for du/dG we obtain




−
−
−+



−



++∝ 1
1
)1(
1G
C)1(
dG
du )G;()G;(
β
ε
θβ
ε
θλα µµ ,          (38)
                                                                                                                                                                              
9
  As pointed out by an anonymous referee, since there is no capital in Mankiw’s model, setting β=0 in (36)
implies M =1-α.
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where 0)dG/d)(/G()G;( >−= µµε µ  is the elasticity of µ with respect to G. Clearly, the
benchmark case characterised by dµ/dG = 0 implies a welfare loss. But if dµ/dG<0,  an
expansionary fiscal policy can lead to a positive welfare effect when )G;( µε  becomes
sufficiently large. Thus, a more elastic response of firms’ market power with respect to
changes in demand and a larger elasticity of output with respect to capital, β, can result in
a positive welfare effect.
V.  Conclusion
A fiscal expansion can stimulate aggregate demand through raising the demand facing
incumbent firms as well as invoking new entry. It is therefore likely that when the goods
market is imperfectly competitive the ensuing equilibrium – achieved after the economy
has experienced a rise in the government expenditure – can be characterised by a different
structure of market share and/or monopoly power. This paper is motivated by the useful
information that could be gained from decomposing the fiscal multiplier into components
that reflect distinct aspects of the policy effects. In particular, one component depicts the
response of output to a fiscal expansion through the conventional channels that disregard
the role of market imperfections. This is then adjusted by a second component that
captures the effect of both firms’ market power as well as the policy-induced change in the
market structure. It is shown that such a decomposition of the output multiplier can be
established within a macromodel of monopolistic competition that allows the elasticity of
substitution among the product varieties to rise as the product range is extended. It is
found that, when the market structure is endogenised in this way, the market structure
effect can play a crucial role in policy effectiveness with regard to both output/employment
and welfare effects associated with a fiscal expansion.
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Finally, a comparison between the fiscal expansion effect described above and the
impact of other positive exogenous shocks – e.g. a technological shock captured by a
change in A in equation (15) – presents itself as an interesting extension of the analysis
provided in this paper10.
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